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Abstract Very few experiments have studied the two item Same/Different6
relation in young human infants. This contrasts with an extensive animal lit-7
erature. We tested young infants with two novel tasks designed specifically to8
provide convergent comparative measures. Each infant completed both tasks9
allowing an assessment of their understanding of the abstract concept rather10
than task-specific abilities. In a looking time task with photographic stimuli11
we found that 8-month-olds are sensitive to the relation but 4-month-olds are12
not. The second task used an anticipatory eye movement paradigm with simple13
geometric stimuli. On each trial, two colored shapes appear and moved up-14
wards behind an occluder. They reappeared on either the upper left or right15
depending on the relation between them. Infants at both ages learned and16
generalized the dependency but only for the different relation. These results17
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2show that human infants can learn the Same/Different concept but that, in18
strong continuity with animal results, their abilities are firmly grounded in19
perception.20
(164 words)21
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1 Introduction24
A fundamental characteristic of human cognition is the ability to make use25
of abstract concepts and perceive similar relations between otherwise unre-26
lated items. These can take a very wide variety of forms including judgements27
of numerosity and of comparative quantity and size (e.g., largest, smallest),28
relations expressed by spatial prepositions (e.g., above, behind, between) and29
numerous others. One of the simplest examples is the two item same/different30
(S/D) distinction. Consider the set of 9 distinct items A to I and the pairs AA,31
BB, CC, DE, FG, HI. The first three pairs share the relationship of sameness32
and (by contrast) the last three have the common property of difference. These33
relationships hold at an abstract level, irrespective of the actual items used34
and it is this abstraction that defines the relationship. Despite the apparent35
simplicity from an adult perspective, it has been difficult to demonstrate con-36
clusively with species other than higher mammals and largely ignored in the37
human infancy literature. Developmental and comparative approaches both38
have a lot to reveal about adult human concepts (Mareschal et al., 2010).39
3Therefore, we sought to investigate S/D concept learning in infants, taking40
into account the extensive animal learning literature.41
Until recently the received wisdom was that humans find S/D tasks very42
easy and animals find them very difficult. For humans the S/D distinction43
would be expected to be a sharp, definite qualitative difference whereas for44
animals, if they succeed at all, the difference would always be graded, uncertain45
and quantitative. The difference between animals and humans is portrayed as46
the contrast between a perceptual, stimulus-driven process and a genuinely47
abstract concept ability. For example, Penn et al. (2008) present the S/D48
concept as an example of a qualitative difference between animal and adult49
human cognitive abilities. In contrast, Wasserman and colleagues suggests that50
human and animal abilities exist on a continuum that takes account of the51
number of items to be judged as same or different and the similarity between52
them (see Wasserman and Young, 2010 for a recent review).53
Evidence from studies with the human adults is equivocal. Smith et al.54
(2008) find a sharp divide between humans and rhesus monkeys on a task that55
systematically manipulated the similarity of pairs of random polygons. Using56
signal detection theory, they found that humans assigned a strict, rule-like57
criteria for Sameness whilst the monkeys performance was more graded. Mak-58
ing the instructions slightly more vague to reduce the influence of language59
made human performance slightly less certain but still apparently concep-60
tual. Whereas, a series of studies by Wasserman and colleagues (Young and61
Wasserman, 2001, 2002b; Castro et al., 2006) show that adult humans some-62
4times respond to multiple item redundancy and between-item similarity as if it63
were a continuously changing value, similarly to pigeons’ responce to entropy64
(Young and Wasserman, 2002a and see below). However, the majority of hu-65
man participants those studies responded in a categorical fashion suggesting66
there may be a special human concept of S/D over and above the perceptual67
regularities that animals appear to exploit. Therefore the gap between adults68
and animals remains large. . It is therefore instructive to consider the devel-69
opment these abilities in human infants. This may bridge the gap between70
animals and humans. By testing infants with paradigms comparable to the71
animal literature, we may reveal the sudden appearance or innate presence of72
a uniquely human concept or we may find evidence that human perceptual73
skills sharpen and mature. Additionally, the animal literature makes it clear74
that it is important how the question is asked. The abilities of animals are75
highly task dependent and different tasks can be reveal different distinctions76
between species. These contrasts are often overlooked when abstract concepts77
are ascribed to young infants and suggest that multiple paradigms should be78
used to establish a genuinely abstract ability. We begin by surveying the an-79
imal literature before considering any existing work with human infants that80
bears on this question.81
1.1 Same/Different learning in animal subjects82
For a long time, animal researchers had difficulty demonstrating S/D discrim-83
ination in pigeons or rats. Zentall and Hogan and colleagues (Zentall and84
5Hogan, 1974, 1976; Zentall et al., 1981) demonstrated that pigeons could use85
aspects of stimulus similarity and difference in a match-to-sample task. For86
example, in Zentall and Hogan (1974) birds were trained on the color match87
or mismatch between cue and target stimuli (e.g., a red or green cuing lamp88
matched/mismatched to red or green target lamps) and were tested for their89
ability to transfer this to new stimuli (e.g. blue and yellow lamps). Speeded90
transfer was found when the second task was congruent to the first. However,91
Premack (1983) pointed that the match-to-sample technique does not nec-92
essarily provide a good test of animals ability to use the abstract relational93
properties of the stimuli because they may simply be responding to the items94
they have seen before. Indeed, even honey bees have been shown to succeed95
on S/D with a delayed match to sample technique (Giurfa et al., 2001).96
Premack (1983) proposed that generalization in the two (or more) item S/D97
task is better suited to testing genuinely abstract S/D concept learning. This98
has proved difficult with animals. Pearce (1991) found that with very extensive99
training pigeons could learn to discriminate when relation was of equality or100
difference in the height of two bars. However, pigeons had failed on an earlier101
version of the task (Pearce, 1988), leading him to be believe the pigeons were102
simply memorizing all the possible configurations. This conflict between item-103
specific learning and acquiring a generalized response is a common problem in104
pigeon categorization experiments (Wright, 1997) The pigeons’ behavior will105
always be some trade off between the two. Therefore the crucial measure of106
performance will be the response to completely novel stimuli.107
6Blaisdell and Cook (2005) reported a successful demonstration of two item108
S/D learning in pigeons where the learning stimuli were colored geometric109
shapes and the pigeons were tested on transfer to novel colored shapes. The110
training stimuli were taken from a set of six shapes in six different colors. On a111
single training trial a same pair (e.g., two red squares) and a different pair (e.g.112
a purple chevron and a green star) were displayed on either side of computer113
monitor and half the pigeons were reinforced to peck the same pair and half to114
peck different pair. Six out of six pigeons reached an 80% criterion within 28115
training sessions. Pigeons were then tested on transfer to either novel shapes,116
novel colors or both novel. Transfer occurred in all conditions but was weakest117
in the novel color condition and strongest when both cues were changed. This118
provides strong evidence that pigeons can transfer in both dimensions, though119
performance was driven primarily by color and the dimensions seemed to be120
treated independently. Thus it seems that although pigeons can make some121
abstraction based on the S/D relation this seems to be tied to individual122
dimensions rather than taking place at a more ’conceptual’ level.123
Further evidence in support of a relatively low-level perceptual account of124
pigeons abilities comes from Young and Wasserman (2002a). In their exper-125
iment, pigeons responded to a 16 item array of computer icons that varied126
in entropy from low (all same) to high (all different), responding was mea-127
sured in a go/no-go task where arrays with higher or lower entropy were selec-128
tively reinforced. Pigeons trained to respond positively to high entropy arrays129
showed better discrimination. Young and Wasserman provided an analysis130
7which supported the interpretation that the pigeons multi-item S/D judge-131
ments followed a logarithmic (rather than linear) entropy function, suggesting132
that same-difference could be considered a dimensional rather than a categor-133
ical distinction in certain cases. However, that does not prevent there from134
also being an abstract concept particularly for pairwise S/D. Flemming et al.135
(2007) demonstrated not only that a larger array (higher entropy) facilitated136
learning of S/D relations in rhesus monkeys. But also that they could sub-137
sequently succeed on a previously failed 2-item relation utilising a colour cue138
to label represent the ’concept’ of S/D. Interestingly, these same monkeys139
then went on to fail a slightly higher order task assessing ’relations between140
relations’ (Exp. 3, Flemming et al., 2007).141
Recently, Wright and Katz (2006) ran a comparative study with pigeons,142
rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys using sets of photographic stimuli143
which provided strong evidence of learning and generalization in all species.144
Rhesus and capuchin monkeys learned at comparable rates while pigeons145
learned more slowly. The animals were required to give one response if the pic-146
tures matched and another if they were different. Correct responses resulted147
in a food reward. All species reached a criterion of 80% with a training set of148
just 8 items (giving 8 same item pairs and 56 different item pairs). However,149
no animals initially learned to transfer this to novel test items. Increasing the150
size of the training in stages lead to full generalization (when accuracy with151
novel items reached equivalent accuracy as baseline) at 128 items for the mon-152
key species and 256 items for pigeons. Thus there were quantitative but no153
8qualitative differences between species and a strong criterion for abstractness154
(equivalent performance with novel material) was met. Wright and Katz spec-155
ulated (based on human similarity ratings) that this continuity would extend156
to higher mammals. This appears to be supported by Mercado et al.’s (2000)157
demonstration of S/D learning in two bottlenose dolphins, albeit using a very158
different paradigm.159
Likewise, in a widely cited study, Oden et al. (1990) tested 11 month old160
infant chimpanzees with several two item S/D tests. In one experiment, the161
chimpanzees were given five minute sessions with pairs of toys to physically162
examine. The two toys could either be the same or different from each other163
(e.g. AA or CD). Immediately afterwards the chimpanzees were given a novel164
pair of toys that maintained or changed the relationship. They looked longer to165
the novel relationship. However, in another experiment the chimpanzees failed166
on a physical matching to sample task where they were required to match167
by hand a pair of items to another pair demonstrating a similar relationship.168
In initial training, the chimpanzees succeeded in reaching a 10/12 criterion169
but they could not transfer this to novel test sets. This contrasts with the170
monkeys and pigeons in Wright and Katz (2006). Oden et al. speculate that it171
was the instrumental aspect of the task that led to the failure with the infant172
chimpanzees unable to integrate perceptual awareness with motor planning.173
Many of these comparative results are of interest from a human devel-174
opmental perspective. The success of a wide range of species at generalizing175
the S/D concept suggests that human infants ought to be able both to per-176
9ceive and act on the abstract relational information and that, at least in the177
case of perception, there is no reason to suspect this ability will be present178
early on. Furthermore, infants might be expected to perceive the S/D relation179
when tested with either rich photographic (Wright and Katz, 2006) or im-180
poverished geometric stimuli (Blaisdell and Cook, 2005). However, Young and181
Wasserman’s (2002) study shows that care must be taken in giving too rich182
a conceptual interpretation to S/D discrimination. Blaisdell and Cook (2005)183
are careful to emphasize the importance of generalization as a measure of a184
genuinely abstract concept. While chimpanzee’s failure to perform physical185
matching (Oden et al., 1990) emphasizes the difference between perceptual186
awareness and instrumental knowledge. It suggests that lack of integration187
between developing systems may lead to failures on certain tasks. The overall188
message from the comparative literature is that one might expect infants to189
succeed on a range of S/D tasks and demonstrate genuine abstract S/D con-190
cept providing care was taken with the design and demands of the task. The191
next section looks at previous relevant studies with children and infants.192
1.2 Same/Different learning in human infants193
Only two studies (Tyrrell et al., 1991, 1993) have directly investigated the194
S/D concept with human infants. An earlier study (Caron and Caron, 1981)195
found that infants habituated to matching pairs of items dishabituated to196
non-matching pairs. However that study was not designed specifically to look197
at S/D concept learning and because infants were only ever habituated to198
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sameness, non-conceptual explanations could not be ruled out, such as the199
infants responding to the greater complexity or the broken symmetry of the200
novel Different display.201
Tyrrell et al. (1991) designed their study to address this problem. Using202
a similar design to Experiment 2 of Oden et al. (1990), Tyrrell et al. tested203
29 week old infants using a novelty preference test. Each infant took part in204
two familiarization/novelty preference tests, one concrete and one abstract. In205
the concrete test, the infants were familiarized with pairs of small toys affixed206
to a board, infants in the Same condition had two 20s exposures to a pair of207
matching toys (AA) and infants in the Different condition saw two dissimilar208
toys (BC). All infants then saw pairs AA and BC next to each other and in209
both groups they preferred the unfamiliar pair. In the second abstract phase210
of the experiment, the infants in the two groups were familiarized to a new211
pair of items with appropriate relation (DD or EF respectively) and tested for212
preference for new items GG vs HI. Infants in both groups looked significantly213
longer at the pair that had a novel relation relative to familiarization. There214
were no interactions between conditions, although there was a main effect that215
infants in the Same condition looked longer overall. The fact that infants in216
both conditions responded to the novel relation in the abstract test suggests217
that they are responding at a conceptual level. However, the very limited218
familiarization phase showing just one pair of items in each case and using219
’toys’ constructed out of a common set of parts increase the likelihood that220
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the response was to some concrete similarity across conditions than through221
the use of a completely abstract S/D concept.222
Tyrrell et al. (1993) used a conditioned head-turn paradigm with a pair of223
matching toys on one side and a pair of mismatching toys on the other. Turning224
to the correct side caused a recording of a children’s story to start playing.225
Infants were assigned to one of four conditions and were reinforced over three226
separate blocks of four, four and eight trials respectively, with an new set227
of objects on each block. Infants in one condition were always reinforced for228
looking at the same pair, whilst in another condition were always reinforced for229
looking at the different pair. Infants in the two other conditions were reinforced230
in the same way for blocks 1 and 2 but were then switched to for the final block231
to be reinforced for the opposite relation. The results supported the hypothesis232
that the infants were learning the concept rather than simple association to233
particular items. All groups increased their looking to the correct side over234
the first 2 blocks but the infants in the switch conditions were impaired at235
the start of the 3rd block. Tyrrell et al. (1993) argued that this pattern of236
results mirrors the reversal shifts found in discrimination learning and fits237
the predictions of the House et al. (1974) model of discrimination learning.238
They also consider the conditioned head turn paradigm to be an instance of239
instrumental learning and so drew a contrast between the success of human240
infants in their task and the failure of the infant chimpanzees in Oden et al.241
(1990), although they acknowledge that the different task demands render it242
impossible to make a direct comparison.243
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An awareness of similarity and difference relations between items is a nec-244
essary pre-requisite for success in the artificial grammar tasks of Marcus et al.245
(1999) In their Experiments 1 and 2 it is also a sufficient condition. Here246
7.5-month-olds were habituated to an artificial grammar of syllables of syn-247
thesized speech. Infants who had been exposed to several minutes of an ABB248
tri-syllabic pattern showed a preference for ABA patterns over ABB patterns249
when tested with completely novel syllables. An awareness of the presence of250
a reduplicated syllable would be sufficient to discriminate between the two251
types of grammar. In Marcus et al. (1999) Experiment 3, the contrast was252
between an AAB and ABB pattern and a simple S/D discrimination would253
no longer be sufficient. Equally informative are Marcus et al. (2007) where254
the AAB/ABA/ABB discrimination was not learned directly with non-speech255
stimuli but could be transferred from speech stimuli, and Johnson et al. (2009),256
where 8- and 11-month-olds were tested with looming geometric shapes and257
more easily learned grammars with late item repetition (ABB) than early rep-258
etition (AAB) or non-adjacent repetition (ABA). These studies suggest that259
S/D discrimination in human infants might be a graded phenomenon just as260
it is in other animals.261
Saffran et al. (2007) replicated the Marcus et al. (1999) auditory findings in262
the visual domain using a task analogue of that task using pictures of dogs and263
cats arranged in triplets of dog-dog-cat, etc. Saffran et al. contrasted infants264
success with pictures of dogs and cats to their failures with simple geometric265
shapes and musical tones (Marcus et al., 2007, Experiment 1) and speculated266
13
that the stimuli must themselves form familiar categories before infants are267
able to map relations from one case to another. It is an open question as to268
the extent to which S/D discrimination is a more general process or relies on269
pre-existing categorical knowledge.270
The existing human infant literature has only investigated the abstract271
S/D concept superficially and indirectly. Yet S/D is the simplest example of272
a genuinely abstract relation and it is, therefore, of substantial interest to273
know the limits and origins of infants abilities on this task. For example, no274
research has looked for asymmetries between Same and Different highlighted275
by Smith et al. (2008). Moreover, it is notable that no studies report any fail-276
ures of younger infants to respond to S/D relations. Extensive research within277
category learning (e.g. Eimas and Quinn, 1994) and spatial perception (e.g.278
Quinn, 2003) has shown that these abilities become increasingly sophisticated279
with age. It would of interest to know more about the development of infants’280
abilities with more abstract relations, such as S/D.281
The present study has several aims. The primary objective is to test pre-282
linguistic human infants using convergent experimental designs that probe the283
robustness of infants’ abstract S/D conceptual knowledge to the same strin-284
gent level as is required of other species. In particular, it is hoped the infants285
will meet Blaisdell and Cook’s (2005) criteria of equal performance with un-286
familiar materials. An additional aim is to demonstrate continuity with the287
animal literature using tasks that have some common elements (allowing for288
necessary differences in experimental design required for testing such different289
14
populations.) Thus, the experiments will use both rich photographic stimuli290
and simplified colored, geometric shapes. The design will include a perceptual291
and an instrumental task to explore the differences that were observed in Oden292
et al. (1990) but which were not found in the work of Tyrrell and colleagues.293
Additionally, the study aims to address the questions raised by Saffran et al.294
(2007) about whether pre-existing category knowledge and/or domain speci-295
ficity are important for S/D learning in human infants. Finally, as ought to be296
the case with any infancy study, we are interested in the development of these297
abilities. How early do competencies arise and how do they change over time?298
Taking all these factors into consideration, two complimentary tasks are299
presented that look at S/D learning. One task is a simple habituation/dishabituation300
paradigm using photographic stimuli (see Mareschal and Quinn, 2001). The301
items are unrelated to each other, not forming an particular category and302
infants will be familiarized with either a same or a different condition as a be-303
tween subjects variable. A second task adapts McMurray and Aslin’s (2004)304
anticipatory eye movement paradigm to assess infants’ learning of associations305
between Sameness leading to one outcome (e.g., an occluded pair of objects306
reappears on the left) and Difference leading to another outcome (e.g., objects307
reappear on the right). Here, the stimuli will be simple geometric shapes and308
both learning and generalization will be assessed. The requirement for the in-309
fant to actively anticipate the correct side makes this a task that investigates310
instrumental learning. The same infants are tested on both tasks. This pro-311
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vides a measure of the robustness of the abstract S/D concept at the level of312
the individual.313
2 Experiment 1 - S/D Discrimination using Photographic Stimuli314
in a Looking Time Task315
Experiment 1 uses a standard habituation/dishabituation paradigm to test for316
sensitivity to the abstract S/D relation in four and eight month old human317
infants. The success of 7.5-month-olds in the related tasks of Tyrrell et al.318
(1991) and Marcus et al. (1999) suggests that by 8 months infants should319
succeed on a direct test of S/D discrimination. An obvious question is if these320
abilities are present in younger infants. Caron and Caron (1981) found that321
infants as young as 12 weeks old dishabituated to Different items after being322
familiarized to items showing the Same relationship. However by not running323
the converse condition, that experiment could not rule out explanations in324
terms of symmetry or complexity. Therefore, a group of four month olds were325
also tested.326
A set of unrelated photographic stimuli is chosen to give a comparison327
to the work of Wright and Katz (2006) whilst being able to address Saffran328
et al.’s (2007) hypothesis that infants will not succeed on such tasks unless329
the objects come from a familiar or coherent category.330
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2.1 Method331
2.1.1 Participants332
A total of 30 full-term human infants provided data, half were around 8 months333
old (M= 249 days, range 232-259 days, 6 female, 9 male ) and half were334
around 4 months old (M= 124 days, range 117-129 days, 9 female, 6 male ).335
A further seven infants were tested but were excluded due to fussiness (5) or336
experimental error (2).337
Infants were recruited via the centre’s participant database. Parents were338
not paid for their infants’ participation but infants were given a small present339
and travel expenses were reimbursed. All infants took part in both Exper-340
iment 1 and Experiment 2 in a single visit. The order of experiments was341
counterbalanced.342
2.1.2 Apparatus343
A Macintosh G4 computer running MATLAB R2006a with the PsychToolBox344
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) controlled display of the stimuli and monitored345
the habituation criterion, using experiment control routines written by the346
authors. The stimuli were displayed on a Samsung 42” plasma screen and347
infants reactions were filmed and recorded using an infrared DV camera for348
later oﬄine coding.349
17
2.1.3 Stimuli350
The stimuli were drawn from a set of 25 colored photographs of inanimate ob-351
jects. All the pictures were scaled to be approximately the same size (300x300352
pixels). Pairs of items were displayed on a uniform mid-grey background at353
a screen resolution of 768 x 1080 pixels with their centers 520 pixels apart,354
which equated to a visual angle of around 10 ◦ per item at a separation of355
around 32 ◦.356
2.1.4 Procedure357
Infants were seated on their care-giver’s lap approximately 1.3m in front of358
the monitor with the middle of the monitor at eye-level. The care-giver was359
instructed not to interact with their infant during the experiment. The experi-360
menter was seated at a control desk in the same room as the infant but hidden361
behind a heavy curtain. The lighting was kept low and quiet classical music362
was played in the background throughout the experiment. When the infant363
was settled, the familiarization phase began.364
The screen started as a blank grey slide and each trial began with a ’boing’365
sound effect (approx. 74dB). Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the366
procedure. Pairs of items then appeared on the screen and remained there367
whilst the infant continued to look at them. A trial finished if infants looked368
away for a single 500ms period, if they accumulated 1000ms of glances away,369
or if a maximum of 20s had elapsed. Looking behavior was coded on-line by370
an experimenter holding a key down on the computer whenever the infant371
18
Fig. 1: Procedure for Experiment 1. Infants were assigned to either the Same
or Different condition. They were familiarized to pairs of items demonstrating
the relevant relation and then shown four novel test trials. The first two had
the familiarized relation while the last two had the opposite relation. A yoked
design ensured that pairs of infants in each condition saw the same test images
but in opposite orders.
was watching the screen. The control software determined when a look away372
criterion or a maximum time was reached. The familiarization phase ended373
if the average length of last two trials was 50% less than the average of the374
first two trials. Otherwise, there were a maximum of 19 familiarization trials.375
These were followed by 4 test trials.376
19
The stimuli displayed depended on the experimental condition. Infants377
were randomly assigned to either the Same or the Different condition. For378
infants in both conditions, each trial featured a novel pair of items. The order379
and selection of items determined by a pseudo-random permutation and care380
was taken that infants in the different condition did not see more images381
overall. The experiment employed a ’yoked’ design, so that the same sets of382
items for one member of each group. A random subset of 19 items where used383
in the familiarization trials. For infants in the Same condition each stimulus384
consisted of an item from this set paired with itself. For infants in the Different385
condition the item on the left was always paired with different item on the386
right. The item that appeared left position on the n-th trial would re-appear387
on the right position on trial n+7 (modulo 19). For each infant, the remaining388
6 pictures were used to produce the test items, two Same test pairs and two389
Different test pairs. An infant in the Same condition would see the Same390
test items first then the Different test items, a yoked infant in the Different391
condition would see the identical test images but in the opposite order.392
2.2 Results393
Looking time scores were calculated by off-line coding of the video recordings.394
A second experimenter, blind to the experimental hypothesis, double coded395
the videos of a randomly selected 20% of the infants. A Pearson correlation396
on the two sets of data gave a high degree of inter-rater reliability, r = 0.96,397
p = 0.001. The mean looking times grouped by age are summarized in Figure398
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2. For each infant the average of their looking times for first two familiarization399
trials (Start of familiarization) was compared to the average for the two test400
trials with the same relation as in familiarization ( Test: Familiar Relation) and401
for the two novel relation trials (Test: Novel Relation), with the comparison402
between the two test conditions giving an indication of discrimination of the403
relation.404
It was notable that very few infants habituated. Only 4 out of 15 of the405
8-month-olds and 5 out of 15 of the 4-month-olds met the habitation crite-406
rion of a 50% drop in looking. The 8-month-olds saw an average of 18.5 trials407
during familiarization and 4-month-olds saw an average of 18.3. For this rea-408
son, habituation was not included as a factor for analysis and we looked at409
all infants together. The experiment was concerned with whether there were410
age differences in response pattern and whether infants significantly increased411
their looking to the test trials showing the novel abstract relation.412
Therefore, a mixed 3x2x2 ANOVA was conducted with trial type as the413
within subject variable ( Start of Familiarization, Test: Familiar Relation,414
Test: Novel Relation), and condition (Same or Different) and age (8 months415
old or 4 months old) as the between subject variables. This revealed a main416
effect of age, F1,26 = 7.96, p = 0.009, indicating a difference in patterns of417
responses between 4- and 8-month-olds. As expected, there was a main effect418
of trial type, F2,52 = 0.046, which was explored with planned comparisons419
(see below). Crucially, there was no main effect of condition, F << 1, nor420
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Fig. 2: Mean looking times in Experiment 1. The light and dark bars indicate
infants in the Same and Different conditions respectively. The leftmost set of
bars show average looking at the start of familiarization, while the middle and
rightmost bars show responses to familiar and novel test conditions. Planned
comparisons and 95% confidence intervals are shown.
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were there any interactions all F’s < 1, indicating that infant were responding421
equivalently in both the Same and Different conditions.422
Planned comparisons investigated the infants response to the S/D relation.423
At 8 months old, infants did show a significant decrease in looking to the424
familiar relation, t14 = 3.51, p = 0.003, and a subsequent increase in looking to425
the novel relation, t14 = 3.56, p = 0.003. This was found for both conditions.426
Eight month old infants who had been familiarized with Same pairs looked427
longer at the Different test items compared to the Same test items, t7 = 2.78, p428
= 0.02. While 8-month-olds who saw Different pairs initially looked relatively429
longer at test pairs with two Same items, t6 = 2.08, p = 0.04. However, the430
4-month-olds showed no overall decrease, t14 = 0.44, p = 0.33, no recovery431
t14 = 0.65, p = 0.26 nor any decrease or recovery within condition, all t’s < 1.432
2.3 Discussion433
These results provide strong evidence that 8 month old human infants are434
sensitive to the abstract relation of S/D. Infants who had been familiarized435
to pairs of same or different objects showed a significant increase in looking436
when shown pairs of new objects with a novel relation. This supports previous437
findings that 7.5-month-olds succeed on artificial grammar tasks (Marcus et al.,438
1999; Saffran et al., 2007) and that 7-month-olds can perform some simple S/D439
discriminations (Tyrrell et al., 1991, 1993). The study also provides continuity440
with the findings of Wright and Katz (2006) showing that human infants441
are also able to make a S/D discrimination using photographic stimuli. This442
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continuity with the animal results and the strength of the effect in the older443
infants suggests that the mechanism is more general than previously believed.444
Saffran et al. (2007) speculate that an awareness of category membership445
was a pre-requisite for noticing higher level commonalities in infants. But446
in this case there was no specific perceptual or conceptual category that all447
objects belonged to. Yet the infants were nevertheless sensitive to the S/D448
relation. Furthermore, this experiment provides stronger evidence than the449
experiments of Tyrrell and colleagues where in each case there were only a450
very small set of items, making it unclear that a genuinely abstract relation451
was being detected.452
Finally, it should be emphasized that there was no differences between the453
conditions in terms of either overall looking time or in decline and recovery454
of looking during the test phase. It might be expected that slides with two455
different objects are intrinsically more interesting than slides with two identical456
objects and that therefore infants in the Different condition would look longer,457
especially at the start of the experiment. In fact, no such differences were458
found. This is strong evidence that the 8 month old infants were responding459
on an abstract level to the S/D relation.460
In contrast, the 4 month old infants did not show a significant decline in461
looking over familiarization and consequentially did not show the recovery or462
discrimination at test. They did not look longer at pairs of items exhibiting463
a novel S/D relationship relative to that which they had been familiarized464
with. One possibility is that the infants were potentially capable of making465
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the discrimination but because they had not habituated they were not liable466
to show a novelty preference at test. In practical terms it may be very difficult467
to test this hypothesis. The infants in this experiment, saw an average of468
over 18 habit trials each of up to 20 seconds and did not habituate. Either469
increasing the number of familiarization trials or increasing the maximum470
length of individual trials might give the infants more time to process the471
stimuli but just as likely is that the experiment would then be too long and472
lose the participants completely.473
3 Experiment 2 - S/D Learning and Generalization using474
Anticipatory Eye Movement475
This experiment adapts the anticipatory eye movement (AEM) paradigm de-476
veloped by McMurray and Aslin (2004), building on the method of their Ex-477
periment 3. A pair of geometric shapes moved together behind an inverted T-478
shaped occluder and reappeared on either one side or the other. If the shapes479
were the same as each other they moved in one direction, if they were differ-480
ent they moved to the other direction. The experiment sought to determine481
if human infants would learn this dependency and correctly anticipate the482
reappearance of the shapes. A final phase tested if they could generalize this483
learning to the novel shapes.484
The current experiment makes several methodological changes to the Mc-485
Murray and Aslin paradigm. First, we reduced the speed with which the stimuli486
moved across the screen. In the original experiment stimuli were fully occluded487
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for only 750ms and infants appeared to be equally likely to expect the stimuli488
to appear along a linear trajectory directly above the occluder as they were489
to have looked either left or right, consistent with the actual paths the stim-490
uli took. It is possible infants have a pre-potent expectation of linear motion491
(see von Hofsten et al., 2000) and so increasing the length of the occlusion492
allows time for the infants to overcome any such bias and search in the correct493
location. Therefore, in the current experiment the stimuli move more slowly.494
In particular, they remain occluded for 3000ms, with the whole animated se-495
quence lasting approximately 6000ms. An additional benefit is that slower496
moving stimuli that remain on the screen for longer allow more opportunity497
for the infants to encode the items that are presented (Day and Burnham,498
1981). A further problem of the original study was that infants missed some499
trials because they were not looking in the right direction. For the infant500
to learn the dependencies it is essential that they are attending to the screen.501
Therefore, in the present experiment, the software only started each trial when502
it determined that the infant was looking at the appropriate lower middle third503
of the screen. Finally, the number of learning trials is increased to give infants504
the fullest opportunity to learn the relation. The full procedure is explained505
below.506
26
3.1 Method507
3.1.1 Participants508
The same infants who took part in Experiment 1 also took part in Experiment509
2. Seventeen 8-months-olds were tested but only 10 infants (M = 252 days,510
range 243-259 days, ) provided data suitable for group analysis. There were511
eyetracker timing and synchronization problems with data from 3 other infants512
and the remaining 4 provided insufficient data due to fussiness. A group of 9513
four month old infants also provided data (M = 123 days, range 117-128 days,514
6 female ). A further 8 were tested but were excluded due to fussiness (3),515
synchronization problems in the eye-tracking data (3) or very sparse data due516
to poor calibration (2).517
3.1.2 Apparatus518
The experiment used a Tobii 1750 eye-tracking camera with integrated 17”519
LCD monitor. It was connected to a Dell PC running Windows XP and520
Exbuilder control software. A digital video camera placed directly above the521
monitor also recorded the infants reactions.522
3.1.3 Stimuli523
The stimuli are shown in Figure 3 and were seen by all the infants. An in-524
verted T-shaped red occluder on a black background was present on the screen525
throughout each block. The occluder was approximately 23.3cm across and526
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11.6cm high at its maximum, subtending a visual angle of 21.9 ◦ by 11 ◦ when527
viewed at 60cm. For the learning phase the paired stimuli were a yellow circle528
and a light blue square. For the generalization phase, test shapes included a529
maroon cross, an orange heart, a pink diamond and a green triangle. Each was530
about 2.5cm across, making a visual angle of approximately 2.4 ◦.531
3.1.4 Procedure532
The infant was seated on the caregiver’s lap in front of the Tobii 1750 at533
60cm from the screen. A preliminary eye-tracking calibration was performed534
in which a small looming circle appeared at centre of the screen and moved535
sequentially to each corner. The experiment itself then immediately began. It536
was divided into four blocks, each of sixteen trials. The first three blocks were537
learning trials and featured only two of the stimulus shapes in all four possible538
pairings; two yellow circles or two blue squares, a circle and a square, or a539
square and a circle. Each pairing occurred four times in each block of sixteen540
learning trials with a randomized ordering for each infant and each block. In541
the generalization phase, eight novel pairings were introduced, four of which542
featured a maroon cross and orange heart in all possible pairings and four with543
a pink diamond and a green triangle. These were randomly mixed with eight544
trials that featured the circle and square from the learning phase. For half the545
infants all Same pairs would always go to the left and all Different pairs go to546
the right. This dependency was reversed for the other infants.547
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 3: (a) A schematic representation of the AEM task. On each trial two
items would appear together at the bottom of the screen, move up and behind
the inverted T-shaped occluder before reappearing on either the left or right
depending on the S/D relation. The arrows and dotted squares were not visible
but represent the path of the objects and the areas of interest used in the
analysis respectively. (b) The pairs of shapes presented during the learning
and generalization phases.
The procedure is illustrated in Figure 3. A bell sound effect marked the548
beginning of each trial when the two objects first appeared at the lower mid-549
dle part of the screen. Once the eye-tracker detected the infant was attending550
to that part of the screen the objects would begin to move. Otherwise the551
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objects remained in place and loomed smaller and larger at a rate of about552
one full cycle per second until they captured the infants attention. The bell553
was then sounded again and objects began to move. In the first phase of each554
trial the objects moved together vertically upwards and behind the occluder,555
a transition which took approximately 1500ms. The objects then continued556
to move at the same rate following one leg of a Y-shaped trajectory behind557
the occluder and emerging on either the left or the right. The occlusion was558
accompanied by the sound of harp cascade. The objects were completely oc-559
cluded for 3000ms. Finally the two objects moved to a resting position in560
the upper left or right when a final sound effect was played and the objects561
disappeared, either shrinking away to a point for all objects on one side or562
shrinking and spinning for all objects on the other side. This took a further563
1500ms. The sound effects had an average intensity of around 73dB. To help564
the infants understand the task, on the very first four trials the occulder was565
semi-transparent so the infant could see the objects moving behind it. The oc-566
culder became gradually less transparent, so that from the fifth trial onwards567
it was completely opaque.568
The experimenter attempted to get the infant to complete all 64 trials but569
this was rarely possible. Several steps were taken to increase the attentiveness570
of the infants. If necessary the experimenter could reorient the infant by caus-571
ing randomly moving cartoon figures to appear on the screen between trials.572
Furthermore, in the third learning block the parents were instructed to talk to573
their children, making a ’peek-a-boo’ style game out of the occlusion sequence.574
30
They were encouraged to use phrases like “Where is it?”, “There it is!” that575
would maintain the infant’s engagement but without giving the infant any in-576
formation about the trial outcomes. Caregivers were silent at all other times.577
Finally, if the experimenter felt the infant was still becoming fussy or other-578
wise disinterested during the final block of the learning phase, the experiment579
was moved directly into the generalization phase.580
3.2 Results581
In general the infants were engaged with the task. The 8-month-olds sat582
through an average of 43.2 out of 48 learning trials and 5.2 out of 8 gen-583
eralization trials, the 4-month-olds saw an average of 37.7 learning trials and584
4.9 test trials. Furthermore, there was no relation between the order in which585
experiments 1 and 2 were carried out and likelihood of a baby not completing586
the experiment [chi-squared: χ21 = 1.83, p = 0.18].587
To compensate for the variation in the amount and quality of data collected588
only relative measures of performance were considered. Two equally sized areas589
of interest (AOI) were defined in the top left and top right and the analysis590
compared fixations to the correct AOI relative to those to the incorrect AOI.591
The two relative measures investigated were; (1) the proportion of fixation time592
during occlusion that was spent looking to the correct AOI and (2) whether the593
first fixation after occlusion was to the correct AOI. For the proportion score594
on each trial the cumulative fixation times to the correct AOI were divided by595
the total fixation to both AOI’s during the occlusion phase. For the first look596
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correct measure, each trial is scored as a success if during occlusion there was597
a fixation in the correct AOI and there was no prior fixation in the incorrect598
area, conversely if the first recorded look was to the incorrect AOI that trial is599
scored as a failure and otherwise the trial is marked as possessing insufficient600
data. All measures were calculated directly from the raw fixation data provided601
by the Tobii 1750.602
The sparseness of the data meant that not all participants had equal603
amounts of data per condition. Therefore, we opted to use weighted averages:604
µ∗ =
∑
i
wix¯i∑
i
wi
where, for a given participant in a given block, x¯i is their average score605
and wi is the number of data points collected for that participant. In this way,606
infants with more data-points contribute proportionally more to the estimate607
of the group mean but their individual (co)variance is ignored so that each608
participant is treated as an independent sample. However, using this measure609
means that standard parametric statistics should not be used. Instead, we610
used the bootstrap method of Efron (Efron and Tibshirani, 1997; Davison and611
Hinkley, 1997) to work out the 95% confidence intervals for each condition.1612
The results organized by block are summarised in Tables 1 and 2 and613
shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b). For the 8-month-olds, their relative looking614
to the correct area was significantly better than the chance level of 0.5 on615
1 Parametric analyses yielded similar results. Only results from bootstrapping are reported
here.
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Fig. 4: Accuracy scores for all participants in Experiment 2 averaged by block.
The solid line represents the relative proportion of looking to the correct area
of interest (AOI) during the occluded period. The dashed line represents the
proportion of occlusions on which there was a fixation to the correct AOI
before there was one to the incorrect AOI. The insets show learning within
the first block. The error bars are 95% confidence intervals from the bootstrap
analysis.
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Relative proportion looking to correct AOI First look to correct AOI
Weighted Mean 95% Confidence Interval Weighted Mean 95% Confidence Interval
Learning 1 0.71 0.64 – 0.78 0.59 0.55 – 0.75
Learning 2 0.71 0.64 – 0.80 0.58 0.42 – 0.63
Learning 3 0.69 0.59 – 0.82 0.39 0.16 – 0.41
Generalization 0.73 0.44 – 0.78 0.50 0.00 – 0.56
Performance within the first learning block
Trials 1–4 0.60 0.46 – 0.75 0.52 0.43 – 0.73
Trials 5–8 0.71 0.56 – 0.87 0.68 0.50 – 0.80
Trials 9–12 0.74 0.68 – 0.79 0.66 0.44 – 0.72
Trials 13–16 0.76 0.65 – 0.88 0.65 0.52 – 0.92
Table 1: Experiment 2 - Accuracy scores for 8 month old infants
Relative proportion looking to correct AOI First look to correct AOI
Weighted Mean 95% Confidence Interval Weighted Mean 95% Confidence Interval
Learning 1 0.64 0.53 – 0.74 0.54 0.49 – 0.73
Learning 2 0.57 0.50 – 0.69 0.53 0.47 – 0.71
Learning 3 0.58 0.42 – 0.62 0.42 0.15 – 0.51
Generalization 0.58 0.21 v 0.68 0.55 0.40 – 0.90
Performance within the first learning block
Trials 1–4 0.64 0.48 – 0.79 0.52 0.43 – 0.78
Trials 5–8 0.69 0.55 – 0.80 0.58 0.45 – 0.77
Trials 9–12 0.69 0.60 – 0.82 0.62 0.40 – 0.82
Trials 13–16 0.57 0.41 – 0.73 0.46 0.46 – 0.91
Table 2: Experiment 2 - Accuracy scores for 4 month old infants
all three learning blocks. They maintained a similar level of accuracy in the616
generalization phase, although this was not significant. This may be a power617
issue as a consequence of there being less generalization data; an average of 5.3618
points per participant compared to 16, 15.5 and 11.7 points in three learning619
blocks. Eight month old infants appear to have learned from the within the620
first block to associate the training stimuli with the sides they would reappear.621
Likewise, in the first block the infants would on average look first to the correct622
side significantly more often than chance. But this decreased over time and in623
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third learning block infants were looking more to the other side. This finding624
may reflect infants learning the time structure of the events. Objects always625
reappeared 3000ms after they were occluded so there is no need to look towards626
the AOI before that point and consequentially infants may learn to cast their627
first looks elsewhere. Although the 4-month-olds showed a qualitatively similar628
pattern of response. The 4-month were only significantly above chance in the629
relative looking for the first block. But, as before this may be an issue of power,630
as there was much less data for the age group. with 12.6, 10.6, 5.2 and 2.9 data631
points per participant for each of the three learning blocks and the test block632
respectively.633
It is notable that at both ages learning happened very quickly. Even if634
we discount the first 4 trials where the occluder is partially transparent and635
infants could potentially see the path of the pairs. In order to establish that636
infants really are learning the task, we performed another analysis looking at637
the time course of learning in the first block. We divided it into 4 sub-blocks638
and calculated the weighted average for each group of 4 trials. We also ran639
another set of bootstrap analyses. The results are shown in the lower halves of640
Table 1 and 2 and in the inset boxes in Figures 4(a) and 4(b). These analyses641
clearly indicate that the infants at both ages are learning something about the642
task very early on.643
One further analysis investigated if infants learn differently between the644
Same and the Different trial types. The trials were classified accordingly and645
another set of weighted averages and bootstrapped confidence intervals were646
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Same pair trials Different pair trials
Weighted Mean 95% Confidence Interval Weighted Mean 95% Confidence Interval
Learning 1 0.57 0.45 – 0.68 0.85 0.74 – 1.00
Learning 2 0.52 0.39 – 0.66 0.80 0.71 – 0.90
Learning 3 0.41 0.20 – 0.65 0.87 0.76 – 0.97
Generalization 0.56 0.36 – 0.82 0.80 0.45 – 0.97
Table 3: Experiment 2 - Same versus different accuracy for 8 month olds
Same pair trials Different pair trials
Weighted Mean 95% Confidence Interval Weighted Mean 95% Confidence Interval
Learning 1 0.49 0.28 – 0.69 0.76 0.64 – 0.87
Learning 2 0.54 0.40 – 0.80 0.58 0.42 – 0.78
Learning 3 0.46 0.33 – 0.52 0.67 0.52 – 0.77
Generalization 0.34 0.02 – 0.62 0.81 0.55 – 0.99
Table 4: Experiment 2 - Same versus different accuracy for 4 month olds
calculated. For this analysis we only looked at the more reliable proportion647
score. The results are presented in tables 3 and 4 and plotted in Figures 5(a)648
and 5(b).. The infants appear to learn to predict where the pairs of different649
items will reappear but are at chance when the items are the same as each650
other. To attempt to confirm this we ran a conventional analysis of variance651
on the combined learning data from the 4- and 8-month-olds using standard652
arithmetic means as the dependent variable, with age as a between subject653
variable and pair relation (same versus different) as a within subject variable.654
This revealed a main effect of age F1,17 =5,76, p = 0.03 and a main effect of655
the S/D relation F1,17 = 12.28, p = 0.003 but no other effects or interactions.656
This indicates that, although the effect was stronger with the 8-month-olds,657
both groups showed the same pattern of learning in only the different case.658
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Fig. 5: Graph showing the accuracy for same or different trials in the learn-
ing and generalization phases for Experiment 1b. Error bars show the 95%
confidence intervals.
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3.2.1 Comparing Experiments 1 and 2659
Finally, we were interested in if there was any consistency in responses across660
the two experiments. As a measure of performance on the looking time study,661
we took the ratio of the two test conditions. A higher value indicates a stronger662
S/D response, namely a greater relative looking to the novel relation. For663
the AEM task we considered two measures, the average accuracy rate across664
the whole learning phase and accuracy in the generalization block as these665
may index different aspects of the ability. Since we were looking for evidence666
of common causation between the tasks we include both age groups in one667
analysis. This gave N=18 (10 eight-month-olds). The analysis showed that668
better performance in the looking time task did not correlate with performance669
in the AEM task, measured against learning (Spearman’s rank correlation670
ρ = 0.02, p = 0.95) or generalization (Spearman’s rank correlation ρ = 0.19,671
p = 0.50).672
3.3 Discussion673
The results of this experiment suggest that 8 month old human infants are674
able to use at least some aspect of S/D distinction on an instrumental learning675
task with simple geometric stimuli. It appears that these infants rapidly learn676
which side the different pairs will reappear and look longer to this location.677
The infants can generalize the rule they have learned, performing as well with 8678
stimulus pairs with novel colors and shapes in the test phase. The infants’ first679
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look after occlusion is initially predictive of where the objects will reappear680
but as they learn the timing of the reappearance they stop looking directly681
to the correct location. The fact that each trial had the same sequence of682
sound effects could also provide scaffolding for the infants to anticipate the683
point at which the objects reappeared. However, the fact that infants only684
appear to learn to predict the Different trials was unexpected and suggests685
that their performance may not be directly attributable to ability to perceive686
the abstract S/D relation, but may be due to a more low level interpretation.687
The fact that infants only learned the dependency for Different trails but688
were at chance with Same pairings indicates that infants are responding to689
something other than a truly abstract S/D concept which in theory would690
lead to equal accuracy on both types of trials. From an adult perspective it is691
obvious that Same and Different are ’opposites’ and so might be expected to692
be associated with different outcomes but this is a highly conceptual interpre-693
tation. The infants mixed performance makes it apparent that the task is not694
quite as simple as adults see it. In fact there are two separate contingencies695
to be learned. Infants must learn that non-matching pairs will always reap-696
pear on one side and, independently, that matching pairs always reappear on697
the other. In fact, as both Young and Wasserman (2002a) and Smith et al.698
(2008) make clear, there is a great deal of asymmetry between the two cases.699
Like the pigeons in Blaisdell and Cook (2005), infants could be responding to700
lower level aspects of the stimuli, symmetry, contrast, etc. that are present in701
the Different stimuli but not in the Same pairs. However, unlike Young and702
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Wasserman (2002a) the infants appear to have learned better with the more703
complex exemplars. This might be precisely because the Different stimuli are704
more complex and are therefore more engaging for the infants prompting them705
to learn. Alternatively, as suggested by Smith et al. (2008), the asymmetry may706
arise from the fact that a Same category is narrow and precisely delineated707
while Different is more broad. Hence Different is potentially easier for the708
infants to learn.709
Interestingly, learning was very rapid. Infants were already above chance710
in the first block of 16 trials. Learning appeared faster than in Experiment 3 of711
McMurray and Aslin (2004), which used a very similar AEM design. In their712
learning phase infants received just 16 learning trials and averaged only 53%713
accuracy. Three factors might account for this improved learning (1) infants714
in our experiment were older (8 months vs 6 months), (2) each trial only715
started when the infant was looking towards the lower middle of the screen716
ensuring that all infants saw (at least part of) all the training trials, and (3)717
the stimuli moved more slowly across the screen giving infants more time per718
trial on being and included being fully occluded for 3000ms (vs 750ms) giving719
them more time to direct their attention to the correct location. This rapid720
learning can be found in other studies, with an alternative anticipatory eye721
movement design. For example, Sobel and Kirkham (2006, 2007) found that 8722
and 5 month old infants were able to learn a spatial dependency after just 4723
exposures to the critical training event.724
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The 4 month old infants in Experiment 2 did not show learning to the725
same extent as the 8 month old infants had done. However, they do seem to726
show a qualitatively similar pattern of responding. They learn the contingency727
for Different pairs but not for Same pairs and they generalize this learning to728
novel shapes. The fact that such young infants respond in this similar fashion729
supports our finding with 8-month-olds. When considered in light of their730
failure on the S/D looking time task, these results suggest that success in731
this task may be mediated by something other than abstract same-different732
concept learning. We return to this point in the general discussion below.733
4 General Discussion734
This study investigated the emergence of abstract concept learning in human735
infants. The two item S/D relation was chosen as an example of a very sim-736
ple abstract concept that had previously been extensively investigated in the737
animal cognition literature but to a much lesser extent with human infants.738
Infants were tested in a passive looking time task and an active anticipatory739
eye movement (AEM) task with visual rich and simple stimuli respectively.740
Two groups of infants, aged 4 and 8 months, were tested to provide a develop-741
mental perspective. In the looking time task, it was found that 8-month-olds742
but not 4-month-olds were sensitive to the S/D relationship. In the AEM task,743
it was found that both 4- and 8-month-olds responded in a similar fashion;744
learning to anticipate the re-emergence of occluded Different paired shaped but745
performing at chance when the pair of shapes were the same as each other.746
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Additionally, both age groups transferred their learning in the Different case747
to trials with novel colored shapes. This pattern of responding is not consis-748
tent with with infants having a full awareness of an abstract concept of S/D749
but is strongly suggestive that the S/D concept develops from sensitivity to750
more perceptual regularities. Furthermore, no correlations were found between751
performance on the two tasks suggesting multiple processes are involved.752
4.1 Looking times with photographic stimuli753
In Experiment 1 infants were familarized with pairs of photographic images754
of either matching or non-matching inanimate objects drawn from a set of755
randomly chosen unrelated objects. They were then shown two further trials756
in which novel objects with a novel relation were presented. The results were757
very clear cut, with 8-month-olds succeeding and 4-month-olds failing at the758
task. In both conditions, 8-month-olds dishabituated to pictures showing the759
opposite relation to that which they had been familiarized with. There was no760
effect of scene complexity, meaning that infants did not look longer at displays761
with 2 dissimilar items relative to 2 identical items either during familiarization762
or at test.763
These results provides clear evidence that 8 month old infants are sensitive764
to the abstract relation of S/D. This finding gives stronger support for infants’765
S/D discrimination ability than previous research. It is more direct proof than766
the indirect conclusions concerning S/D awareness than may be drawn from767
7.5 month olds success on artificial grammar tasks (Marcus et al., 1999; Saffran768
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et al., 2007). It is a more robust finding than those of Tyrrell et al. (1991) and769
Tyrrell et al. (1993) where only a small set of objects were used and paired770
preference paradigms meant that Same and Different pairs were simultaneously771
presented. In the present study infants saw a wide range of unrelated objects772
whose only common feature was the S/D relationship between them and they773
only saw a single pair of items at a time.774
The design of this study also provides continuity with the findings of Wright775
and Katz (2006) concerning S/D learning in monkeys and pigeons. These re-776
sults show infants are also able to make a S/D discrimination using photo-777
graphic stimuli, even more rapidly and with smaller example sets. This conti-778
nuity with the animal findings and the strength of the effect in 8 month old779
infants suggests the mechanism is more general than previously believed. Note780
that the animal participants were rewarded for learning while human infants’781
performance is a measure of spontaneous discrimination. Moreover, the fail-782
ure of 4-month-olds suggests that this S/D discrimination is not an innate783
response but is due to concept learning. Wright and Katz (2006) found that784
increasing the number of exemplars improved performance of the pigeons and785
monkeys so a similar manipulation may lead to better S/D discrimination in786
the younger infants. However, the current design is probably at the limit for of787
attention for the number of familiarization trials for such a young age group.788
(Infants saw up to 19 familiarization trials each of up to 20 seconds, plus 4789
test trials). An alternative approach might be to have many more shorter trials790
and repetitions. Mareschal et al. (2005) found that a regime of rapid, repeated791
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presentation (each trial 2 seconds long seen multiple times) led 4-month-olds792
to succeed in forming categories based on perceptual correlations that would793
otherwise not be found before 7 months old. A similar design may reveal a794
sensitivity of 4-month-olds to the S/D relation.795
Seven month old infants can learn the AAB/ABA discrimination with syn-796
thesized syllables (Marcus et al., 1999) and with pictures of dogs and cats797
(Saffran et al., 2007) but do not learn directly with musical tones, timbres or798
animal sounds (Marcus et al, 2007). Saffran et al. (2007) suggest that stimuli799
must belong to a familiar category if infants are to notice the higher order800
relations between them. But, in this experiment, the stimuli did not form a801
single meaningful category and many of the individual stimuli were very likely802
to be completely unfamiliar to the participants. Nevertheless, 8-month-olds803
were sensitive to the higher order S/D relation between the items.804
4.2 Anticipatory eye movement with colored geometric shapes805
In Experiments 2 an AEM paradigm demonstrated that infants can rapidly806
learn to anticipate where a pair of geometrical shapes would reappear but807
only when the pair of objects were different from each other. Infants spent808
longer looking to the correct area of the screen while the objects were oc-809
cluded. The infants were also able to generalize their learning to novel shapes810
that also shared the different relation. But their performance was always at811
chance when the two objects were the same as each other. This was a surprising812
finding and one that is difficult to explain fully without further investigation.813
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Nevertheless, the effect appears to be real since a very similar pattern of re-814
sponding was found in both 4- and 8-month-olds. Moreover, the asymmetry is815
strongly suggestive of a non-conceptual interpretation of infants abilities.816
Unlike in Experiment 1, where infants must learn just one relation and817
simply detect its violation, in Experiment 2 the task is more complex; infants818
must simultaneously develop categories of Sameness and Difference and as-819
sociate them with two possible outcomes. It appears that the infants, at both820
ages, rapidly learn which side the different pairs will reappear and look longer821
to this location. They can generalize this rule to novel pairs of shapes. But822
they do not learn the Same relation. This may imply that Difference is a823
simpler concept for infant than Sameness. One possible reason may be that824
to establish Sameness one must check that all properties of two objects are825
equivalent, whereas any single discrepancy establishes Difference, as suggested826
by Smith et al. (2008). Hence, under the challenging conditions of the AEM827
task, infants only manage to learn the simpler contingency. This difference be-828
tween tasks and between Sameness and Difference within Experiment 2 shows829
that infants do not have a single, unitary S/D concept directly equivalent to830
that of adults.831
One simpler explanation that has to be ruled out first is the possibility832
that infants’ performance could be accounted for because they were exhibiting833
a systematic side bias, as was found in some infants in the experiments of Mc-834
Murray and Aslin (2004). This can be discounted on two grounds. Firstly the835
side to which the Same and Different pairings appeared was counterbalanced836
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across infants, for half the infants Different pairs would go to the left and Same837
pairs would go to the right, whilst for the remaining infants this dependency838
was reversed. Therefore, nothing in the geometry of the experimental set up839
(e.g., the layout of the testing room) could systematically influence infant at-840
tention to one side or another. Secondly, a side bias would lead to a below841
chance performance on the unbiased side. Such a bias was never seen in the842
data with performance on the Same trials being very close to the chance level843
of 50% in all cases.844
Instead, it may be due to the infants responding to lower level aspects of845
the stimuli such as symmetry, contrast, complexity, etc.. When Blaisdell and846
Cook (2005) demonstrated two item S/D learning with geometric shapes in847
pigeons they were careful to chose a set of colors and shapes for their stimuli848
that would be highly dissimilar so that it would not be possible to account849
for transfer in terms of the similarity between stimuli. They also point to850
converging evidence from other studies that supports the case for an abstract851
S/D in the pigeons by ruling out any other common perceptual property across852
experiments (e.g. Cook et al., 1997; Cook, 2002). However, in Experiments 2853
an S/D interpretation is not appropriate since there is no learning of the Same854
cases and so alternative mechanisms must be considered.855
In Young and Wasserman (2002a), pigeons learned S/D discriminations856
better with larger arrays of items that increased their awareness of the redun-857
dancy / dissimilarity contrast. Although those findings do not bear directly on858
the performance of the human infants in this experiment, one related expla-859
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nation might be that the Different stimuli are more complex with contrasting860
colors and they were more engaging leading the infants to attend and learn861
with these stimuli. Although this interpretation seems implausible from an862
adult perspective, only further experiment could rule out such an explana-863
tion of the infant behavior. It is even more surprising that neither group of864
infants learned the Same dependency when the learning phase used only two865
objects (the yellow circle and the blue square). With just four trial types in866
the learning phase, it might be expected that infants could learn a direct as-867
sociation between each pairing and its eventual reappearance. However, this868
did not happen with either age group and the fact that the identical pattern869
was found in the generalization phase suggest that performance must be ac-870
counted for in terms of some kind of abstract feature of the stimuli. Future871
studies could systematically vary the common and distinct properties of the872
stimuli to investigate this. For example, using arrays of multiple objects or a873
wider selection of objects in the learning trials or using photographic stimuli874
to investigate the issue of the infants’ engagement with the stimuli. Without875
further studies, it is not possible to give a clear explanation for the surprising876
findings of Experiments 2. Nevertheless, the identical pattern of responding877
between ages and between learning and generalization makes it likely that878
there is some abstract process underlying the infants behavior in this task.879
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4.3 Infants’ understanding of Same/Different as an abstract concept?880
While the results of these experiments show that 8-month-olds (but not 4-881
month-olds) respond to the relation of Same and Different with photographic882
stimuli and that both 4- and 8-month-olds learn and generalize some property883
of Different geometric shapes, questions remains as to the extent to which these884
abilities can be said to be abstract and the extent to which they can be said to885
be conceptual. The two are not necessarily synonymous and the question is of886
interest to developmentalists. Jean Mandler (Mandler, 2004) argues that there887
is a fundamental difference between the perceptual and the conceptual. The888
former referring to implicit perceptual sensorimotor knowledge while “concept889
refers to declarative knowledge about object kinds and events that is poten-890
tially accessible to conscious thought.” (p.4, Mandler, 2004). In particular she891
claims that concepts are not just complex associations of percepts but are a892
different mode of representation created from perceptual inputs and a core set893
of innate image-schemas (see chapter 4, Mandler, 2004). By contrast, Quinn894
and Eimas (2000) take a strongly empiricist perspective arguing for continuity895
between percepts and concepts. Our results help clarify this debate.896
From Mandler’s perspective there can be two interpretations of S/D dis-897
crimination abilities found in these experiments. Either these abilities are due898
to the infants detecting perceptual regularities in the stimuli they encountered899
or could be a consequence of their awareness of a concepts of Sameness and900
Difference. Since, in Experiment 1, the stimuli are all unrelated, it is hard to901
point to the perceptual features that the stimuli have in common and which902
48
would contribute to a concept of sameness. Sameness appears to be a concept903
but not a category. Here, the commonality between instances is of a different904
kind to that found in object-based categories such as trees or dogs. Infants as905
young as 3 months can form such categories (Eimas and Quinn, 1994) as can906
pigeons (Herrnstein and Loveland, 1964). In such cases, although it may not be907
possible to determine exactly which features define the category, it is clear that908
they are perceptually grounded. Members of these categories share many sim-909
ilarities in terms of texture, color, shape and spatial arrangement of features.910
Whilst all the Same pairs do share a horizontal translational symmetry, this911
is not a shared perceptual feature per se, but operates more like an abstract912
rule applicable to those cases. Nevertheless, Sameness or object-identity with-913
out being a concrete or abstract object-category is fundamentally a perceptual914
property and may contrary to Mandler’s view develop from perception alone.915
A parallel can be found in Quinn’s (2003) account of development of spatial916
relation categories in infancy. Quinn reviews evidence that infants under 1917
year do have non-object based concepts of spatial relations such as above, be-918
low, between but that these develop in sophistication and abstraction over the919
first year consistent with a perceptually grounded account, where innate core920
concepts are not necessary. The failure of 4-month-olds to respond to the S/D921
distinction with photographic stimuli indicates that this ability also develops.922
Although this by itself does not necessarily support either position.923
The results of Experiment 2 also support a perceptual interpretation. In-924
fants are not applying an abstract S/D rule to the stimuli but are abstracting925
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some perceptual feature to identify the Different stimuli and to learn to pre-926
dict where these stimuli reappear and generalize this learning to new Different927
stimuli. This ability is largely unchanged across the two ages tested who show928
a very similar pattern of response. Infants of both ages seeming to possess929
the same ability to discriminate and generalize only with Different stimuli. A930
surprising finding made more so when we compare this to the successes and931
failures of the same group of infants on the looking time tasks. A result which932
is problematic for Mandler’s dual process account; if eight month old infants933
possessed an abstract conceptual awareness of the S/D relation that allowed934
them to succeed on the looking time task, why is this concept not accessible935
in the AEM task? If the abilities are based on a perceptual analysis then this936
difference between the tasks can be explained in terms of the substantial per-937
ceptual differences between the stimuli used in the task. This interpretation938
leads to the testable predictions that using simpler stimuli in the looking time939
task might lead 4-month-olds to succeed on the S/D discrimination whilst us-940
ing more complex stimuli in the AEM may induce the older infants to learn941
the dependencies for the Same stimuli.942
Of course, there is a further problem with a conceptual interpretation to943
the looking time results with 8-month-olds in that monkeys and pigeons can944
also make S/D discriminations with photographs (Wright and Katz, 2006).945
Likewise, Blaisdell and Cook (2005) show that pigeons can discriminate S/D946
relations with colored geometric shapes. In neither case would any researchers947
be likely to attribute these successes to the animals possessing human-like948
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concepts but these results do prove problematic for Mandler’s account, where949
perceptual meaning analysis is required to form and utilize abstract concepts.950
Mandler (2004) is dismissive of Young and Wasserman’s (2002) results, claim-951
ing that these are purely abstract perceptual abilities but does not address the952
wider comparative literature where the accumulation of data across a range953
of paradigms make clear that non-human animals can go beyond the purely954
perceptual features of S/D stimuli. Penn et al. (2008) do look at a wider set955
of animal studies but make their strong claims that human and non-human956
S/D abilities are qualitatively different without considering how human infants957
perform on these tasks. Our results bridge this gap and support the position of958
Wasserman and Young (2010) that there are continuities between humans and959
animals. We find that infants show asymmetries between Same and Different960
and that, as in other species, their abilities depend upon the particulars of ex-961
perimental set-up and perceptual features available in a given task. The S/D962
concepts of both human infants and animals appear to be firmly grounded in963
perception.964
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